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Abstract: Sentience involves having some degree of awareness but awareness of self is 
not as complex as some people believe. Fully functioning vertebrate animals, and some 
invertebrates, are sentient but neither humans nor non-humans are sentient early in 
development or if brain-damaged. Feelings are valuable adaptive mechanisms and an 
important part of welfare but are not all of welfare so the term welfare refers to all 
animals, not just to sentient animals. We have much to learn about what non-human 
animals want from us, the functioning of the more complex aspects of their brains and of 
our brains and how we should treat animals of each species. Animal welfare science will 
continue to play a major part in determining how we fulfill our obligations to the animals 
with which we interact. 
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Introduction. It was a privilege to read the erudite commentaries of so many 
distinguished persons about the ideas presented in Sentience and Animal Welfare 
(Broom, 2016, Broom, 2014). I respond here to some of the issues raised in these 
commentaries. At a time when there are rapid developments in our ability to use 
imaging to record brain function while an individual is behaving — and to evaluate 
cognitive ability, awareness, feelings and emotions — discussion of these subjects in 
relation to a wide range of species is important. Scientists and philosophers should 
address the issues raised and inform the public so that there is more widespread 
knowledge about animal functioning. People will then be better able to decide about 
their attitudes to animals and what treatments of animals are right or wrong. 
 
What is sentience? Some commentators agree that sentience is usefully defined 
(Section 1.3 and glossary, Broom, 2006) as “having the awareness and cognitive ability 
necessary to have feelings.” However, the further explanation: “a sentient being is one 
that has some ability: to evaluate the actions of others in relation to itself and third 
parties, to remember some of its own actions and their consequences, to assess risks and 
benefits, to have some feelings and to have some degree of awareness” elicits from 
Rowlands the observation that to demand all of these capabilities, especially including 
concepts of self as part of awareness, could limit unreasonably the range of animals 
considered to be sentient. However, after considering the evidence presented in the 
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book, I conclude that all vertebrate animals and some molluscs and crustaceans are 
sentient even with the inclusion of “some degree of awareness.” My definition of 
awareness as “a state during which concepts of environment, of self and of self in 
relation to environment result from complex brain analysis of sensory stimuli or 
constructs based on memory,” is discussed further and the limited way in which some 
authors have used “self-awareness” is criticized (e.g., Section 6.6). Some concept of self is 
needed in order to avoid damaging one’s own body and to take account of one’s own 
capabilities. All of these animals have this ability, even if they could not be demonstrated 
to recognize their own image in a mirror; so they are not excluded by the reference to 
awareness. 
 
As Durham and Rolle note, the abilities needed in order to be sentient are important 
subjects (Chapters 4-7 and 9) and many different methodologies are useful for assessing 
sentience and welfare. I agree with Durham about the importance of methods developed by 
psychologists in assessing animal welfare and identifying animal needs. The use of operant 
methodologies for evaluating needs was pioneered by Duncan and others and is continuing 
to be very important in animal welfare research. However, measures that might be 
distorted by human reporting are clearly less reliable than those that cannot be thus 
distorted, so some social psychology methods give information about human attitudes but 
are less useful in measuring animal welfare. While complex explanatory concepts should be 
used for complex phenomena and parsimony in explanation can sometimes lead to errors 
(Sections 4.12 and 10.4), evaluating the reliability of data is key to being able to make 
deductions about the concepts. 
 
One theme of the book (Chapter 9) is commented on by Rolle (“under certain conditions, 
humans can have lower cognitive and sentient functions than non-human animals”) and 
also by Chandrasekera. The sophistication of behaviour that some domestic animals and 
garden birds show, and the complexity of concepts that these individuals must have, is 
greater than that which is possible for some humans. Hence the dividing line between 
human and non-human functioning is blurred. This conclusion is reached by scientific logic. 
Clarke emphasizes that studies of sentience and welfare are serious scientific endeavours 
and notes that, while many scientists are reluctant to agree with this view and are unwilling 
to publish work in these areas in the highest status scientific journals, evidence like that 
accumulated in this book is making their position untenable.  
 
Is welfare limited to sentient beings? As he has stated in many previous publications 
(e.g., Duncan, 1993, 2006), Duncan expresses his view that sentience in an individual is 
a prerequisite for the use of the term welfare, that is, that he would not refer to the 
welfare of a non-sentient being. Duncan has been a major contributor to improving our 
understanding about the feelings of animals. Although I did not use the word sentience 
in publications until about 15 years ago, there is much discussion of it in Broom (2003), 
and Duncan is mistaken in suggesting that I did not write about feelings until recently. In 
two papers on welfare in 1991, two papers on the evolution of feelings, and all of my 
books, I have emphasized the importance of feelings as biological mechanisms helping 
individuals to cope with their environment and hence as being a key part of welfare 
(Broom, 1991a, 1991b, 1998, 2001, 2003; Fraser and Broom 1990; Broom and Johnson, 
1993; Broom and Fraser, 2015).  
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As explained in Section 3.2, “although feelings are an important part of welfare, welfare 
involves more than feelings; consider the examples of an individual with a broken leg 
but asleep, an addict who has just taken heroin, an individual greatly affected by disease 
but unaware of it, or an injured individual whose pain system does not function (Broom, 
1991b, 1998).” I suggest that most people would want to use the word welfare for 
humans and all other animals at all times, even if the individual was incapable of having 
feelings because of having a less complex brain, or because of being at an early stage of 
brain development such as a four-month-old human fetus, or because of decline in brain 
function resulting from a disease such as Alzheimer’s. 
 
Duncan refers to “three schools of thought on what animal welfare is about”: subjective 
experience and feelings, biological functioning, and natural living. I see these as ideas 
that the general public might have but I believe that those who have read the writings of 
Duncan, Fraser (2008), and others would see that biological functioning includes 
feelings, so there is no dichotomy, and the concept of what is natural has to be 
considered carefully. As explained in section 3.3.5 and Chapter 1 of Broom and Fraser 
(2015), natural conditions and mechanisms have affected the needs of animals, but 
naturalness should not contribute to the definition of welfare. These logical failings also 
apply to the diagram with three overlapping rings by Appleby (1999) that refers to the 
same three supposed aspects of welfare. Donaldson and Kymlicka agree that what is 
natural is not necessarily good for welfare. 
 
When assessing the welfare of animals (Chapter 8), the measures are designed to find 
out how well the individual is coping with the world around it. This includes measures of 
negative feelings and other responses or effects; but much current research is also 
aimed at assessing how good welfare is. Good welfare, and the associated positive 
feelings, might be measured by the extent of behaviours, such as play, or physiological 
changes such as oxytocin concentration, or activity in particular regions of the brain, or 
other measures of body condition and health. We need to combine the measures of 
feelings, as adaptive changes, with other adaptive changes. 
 
A pragmatic problem with Duncan’s position is evident from changes in opinions since 
the 1960s. Fifty years ago, many people would have considered only humans to be 
sentient, and there are many today who have this view. Using Duncan’s position, these 
people would not use the term welfare for any companion, farm or laboratory animal. 
Similarly, using Duncan’s definition, many people today would not refer to the welfare of 
fish. It is more logical and more useful for welfare to mean the state of an individual as 
regards its attempts to cope with its environment and hence for the word to be 
applicable to all animals, whether sentient or not. Inanimate objects and plants do not 
have a nervous system or brain and they cannot show behaviour or have coping 
systems, so we do not talk about their welfare. 
 
The concepts of sentience and welfare do not have to be overlapping to be usable. Most 
people find that the term welfare, as defined in Section 3.2 and above, is simple to 
understand and use. This definition is used in E.U. scientific reports and by the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE, 2011), as discussed in Section 3.2 and by Broom 
(2015). Rowlands agrees that “sentience is a plausible sufficient condition for moral 
standing.” He argues that we should not just consider pleasure and pain but also what 
motivates animals and all aspects of how they are functioning. 




How different are humans, monkeys, birds and fish? Copeland and Clarke both 
emphasise a key theme of Sentience and Animal Welfare, namely, that the differences 
between humans and other vertebrate animals are smaller than most people believe. 
Recent information about fish extends the work of Duncan, Portavella, and others 
(Sneddon et al., 2003, Chandroo et al., 2004, Portavella et al., 2004) showing that fish 
have fear and pain behaviour, and that in their brains there are areas with functions that 
closely parallel those of the amygdala and hippocampus in mammals (see also Key). 
Brain areas, for example, the medial and lateral telencephalic pallium, process emotion 
and learning. Kawakami and colleagues have shown that zebrafish, learning from a fear 
situation, have brain activity in the habenula and other areas and that transgenic fish 
who lack such areas, or normal fish treated with a neurotoxin that targets such areas, 
cannot respond to and learn from fear responses (Asakawa et al., 2008, Agetsuma et al., 
2010, Muto et al., 2013, Kawakami, personal communication). In general, primates have 
been shown to have impressive cognitive abilities. However, recent learning studies 
(Salwiczek et al., 2012, Pepperberg and Hartsfield, 2014) show that cleaner wrasse fish 
and parrots perform better in a complex learning task, in which they have to learn to 
discriminate reliable from ephemeral food sources, better than chimpanzees, 
orangutans and capuchin monkeys. 
 
How well can we communicate with non-human animals? The desirability of finding 
out more about communication within other species, about how to communicate better 
with individuals of other species, and about how to spread information about them is 
discussed by Copeland. The scientific writing style, like that in Sentience and Animal 
Welfare, is not always easy to follow, as Sammarco and Duncan rightly point out. The 
story-telling approach advocated by Copeland might not convince the cynical, but it 
would inform the average person much better than a book with every fact and opinion 
backed up by quoting references. Story-telling helps the reader and it is good to support 
science with anecdote, provided that the anecdote is true and representative of such 
animals and there is no unwarranted interpretation of the observation. The difficulties 
of the animal welfare scientist are exemplified by the criticism of a whole E.U. scientific 
report leveled by some influential scientists because it included one reference to 
material only available on the Internet and not in a refereed scientific journal. 
 
An interesting question raised by Donaldson and Kymlicka is “what sorts of relations 
do domestic animals want to have with us?” The most “successful” land animals in the 
world are those that depend on humans. For example the chicken is by far the most 
successful bird species. However, the preferences of the individual chicken should be 
considered, as should all of the factors that affect its welfare, while humans control its 
living conditions. This argument is not just relevant to farm animals. Investigation of 
animal welfare makes it clear that the use of animals for human companionship is 
sometimes very negative in its consequences for the animals’ welfare. Many caged 
companion animals show clear evidence of poor welfare and would not remain with 
humans if they had the option to leave.  
 
Can the way of thinking about animals be changed further? In Section 1.2 and other 
parts of this book, as well as at length in Broom (2003), the way in which most people 
refer to and think about non-human animals is challenged. The very use of the term 
“non-human animals” rather than just “animals” is different from the writing of most 
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people. As Midgely (1978) wrote, "We are not just rather like animals, we are animals." 
The many ways in which human attitudes and actions are anthropocentric is worth 
pointing out and criticizing. It is perhaps such critiques of peoples’ thinking that led 
Chandrasekera to call Sentience and Animal Welfare “intellectually engaging and 
morally disturbing at the same time” and to say that it “will lead you to develop an 
appreciation for the profound inadequacies of your own species.”  
 
As Sammarco explains, concern about welfare is progressing, but early societies might 
have had many of the same concerns. Duncan also draws attention to reference to the 
sentience and feelings of animals in accounts written long before those mentioned in 
Chapter 3. Some early ideas of this kind are discussed by Broom (2003, 2011) and 
Fraser (2008). 
 
Clarke sees potential for books like this one to change public opinion and government 
policies. One example is the changes in society like those discussed in Section 11.3, 
referring to the public “pulling” for change in the extent of use of sustainable systems, 
including good welfare measures in animals, rather than the animal production industry 
“pushing” their own agenda. Donaldson and Kymlicka agree with the arguments in 
Chapter 3 and Sections 11.5 and 11.8 that animal ethics should be informed by scientific 
findings on sentience and animal welfare. However, they question the suggestion that a 
principal aim should be to improve animal welfare within animal usage systems rather 
than eliminating such systems. They suggest that animal welfare science is affected by 
being funded by commercial sources or government bodies that defend or promote 
agriculture. I find that almost all animal welfare science is objective and independent of 
such aims. Most funding comes from governments and only a small proportion from the 
animal industry or animal protection society sources that have an agenda to defend. My 
policy has always been to accept research funding only if all results can be published 
with no modification or veto from the sponsor.  
 
Efforts that result in changing animal production methods in ways that improve animal 
welfare are widely regarded as desirable in a society where the animal usage is 
continuing. However, some animal usage has ceased, in part because there was evidence 
from research indicating poor welfare, for example, fur farming and cosmetics testing in 
many countries. Much more important in my view are the changes affecting millions of 
animals such as bans on keeping calves in crates; sows tethered or in stalls; and hens in 
battery cages; and methods of animal handling, transport and killing that result in poor 
welfare. As Chandrasekera advocates, animal welfare standards based on scientific 
evidence are now needed whenever animals are used. 
 
Freedoms, rights and obligations. The idea in Sections 2.5 and 7.3, supported by 
Duncan, is that the “five freedoms” are problematical: that they are now useful only in 
preliminary thinking about how animals should be treated and should not be considered 
as a key part of thinking about animal welfare because our knowledge of animal needs 
and how to assess welfare have progressed substantially. However, Duncan considers 
that the concepts of rights and obligations are “opposite sides of the same coin.” To a 
large extent this is true but an important problem, described in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 and 
by Broom (2003), is that the concept of rights is used to justify some harmful actions. 
Rights are not “dismissed” in either book, but it is argued that it is better to think in 
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